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Abstract 
It has been argued that all of cognition can be understood in terms of Bayesian inference. It 
has also been argued that analogy is the core of cognition. Here I will propose that these 
perspectives are fully compatible, in that analogical reasoning can be described in terms of 
Bayesian inference and vice versa, and that both of these positions require a thorough 
cybernetic grounding in order to fulfill their promise as unifying frameworks for 
understanding minds. From the Bayesian perspective of the Free Energy Principle and 
Active Inference framework, thought is constituted by dynamics of cascading belief 
propagation through the nodes of probabilistic generative models specified by a cortical 
heterarchy "rooted" in action-perception cycles that ground the mind as an embodied 
control system for an autonomous agent. From the analogical structure mapping 
perspective, thought is constituted by the alignment and comparison of heterogeneous 
structural representations. Here I will propose that this core cognitive process for 
analogical reasoning is naturally implemented by predictive coding mechanisms. However, 
both Bayesian cognitive science and models of cognitive development via analogical 
reasoning require rich base domains and priors (or reliably learnable posteriors) from 
which they can commence the process of bootstrapping minds. Here in the spirit of the 
work of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, I propose that embodiment provides many of the 
inductive biases that are usually described in terms of innate core knowledge. (Please note: 
this manuscript was written and finalized in 2012) 
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Philosophical background and goals 
"[Science can be likened] to a boat which, if we are to rebuild it, we must rebuild plank by 
plank while staying afloat in it. The philosopher and the scientist are in the same boat. Our 
boat stays afloat because at each alteration we keep the bulk of it intact as a going concern." 
–Willard van Orman Quine (1908-2000), discussing Otto Neurath (1882-1945) 
In attempting to understand the mind, the erroneous philosophical positions of dualism 
and eliminative reductionism are avoided by recognizing that cognition can be explained in 
terms of multiple compatible levels of analysis (D. C. Dennett, 2003; Hofstadter, 1979). 
Fundamentally, an aspect of the mind is not understood unless it can be described from 
multiple perspectives, as well as their particular correspondences. This sort of 
epistemological pluralism allows us to more fully specify the meaning of our constructs, 
and thus minimize conceptual ambiguity. 
David Marr famously proposed three complementary levels of analysis for explaining 
cognitive phenomena: 1) the computational level describes what a system does and why it 
does it; 2) the algorithmic level describes how a system accomplishes these functions 
through processes that build and manipulate representations; 3) the implementation level 
describes how these processes and representations are physically realized, whether by 
nervous systems or computer-based intelligences (J. P. Mitchell, 2006). Although this paper 
will primarily use Marr’s language, it is important to note that an unbounded number of 
valid perspectives are possible (Ziporyn, 2004), which are more or less effective at “carving 
nature at its joints” such that relevant emergent phenomena can be comprehended.1 For 
instance, an alternative set of joints can be found if one considers behavior, cognitive 
events, neural events, and experience as different aspects of multi-faceted minds. 
However, these different views are incommensurate without using probability theory and 
the language of computation as translating principles. Here, we describe a synthetic 
approach to understanding neuropsychological phenomena in terms of a perspective that 
integrates dynamical systems theory and machine learning within a “Bayesian-Analogical 
Cybernetics” (BAC) framework. BAC describes all cognitive processes in terms of Bayesian 
inference, analogical reasoning, and the cybernetic perspective of minds as control systems 
for embodied agents, which develop through their interactions with environments. 
 
                                                        
1 In The Phaedrus, the Platonic dialogue from which the expression of “carving nature at its joints” is derived 
(Griswold, 1996), Socrates likens the philosopher to a butcher seeking to divide an animal in ways that are 
anatomically sensible. But even here, the particular joints identified are partially dependent on pragmatic 
factors, or simply the limited-pragmatism of tradition, as can be verified by seeing the diversity of cuts of 
meat produced by butchers of different cultures. However, variation of classification schemes does not mean 
that all conceptualizations are similarly valid in all contexts. 
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Bayesian cognitive science 
A whirlwind tour of Bayesian inference; from basic hypothesis testing to computer 
simulations 
"Probability theory is nothing but common sense reduced to calculation." 
–Pierre-Simon Laplace (1749–1827) 
Simply, we will use the term “Bayesian” to describe all methods that attempt to combine 
and update conditional probabilities on the basis of prior beliefs and evidence. Less simply, 
this section will provide an introduction to Bayesian methods of probabilistic inference for 
which there are five important points that it would be helpful for the reader to understand 
before proceeding to the next section: 
1. Bayesian inference is based on conditional probabilities: i.e., degrees of certainty for 
which the order of specification matters; e.g. “what is the probability that the 
ground is wet, given that there are clouds” vs. “what is the probability that it is 
raining, given that the ground is wet.” 
2. Bayesian methods can be used to combine beliefs from past experiences (i.e., prior 
probabilities) with current observations, and then update these prior beliefs to 
obtain empirically tested revised beliefs (i.e., posterior probabilities). These updated 
prior beliefs—now known as the posterior probability distribution—provide new 
priors for further hypothesis refinement. 
3. Bayesian model selection involves a process where different hypotheses, and 
systems of hypotheses, compete to explain the greatest amount of observations with 
the minimum amount of model complexity (i.e., parsimony). 
4. Elaborate hypothesis systems can be represented using graphical models, whose 
potentially complex structures can specify intricate dependencies among 
conditional probabilities. 
5. In order to generate inferences from graphical models, computer simulation 
techniques such as Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) use semi-random sampling 
to estimate associated variable-specific (i.e., “marginal”) and combined (i.e., “joint”) 
probability distributions. 
“Bayesian” approaches are distinguished by using prior knowledge to help interpret 
observed data, and then updating this knowledge on the basis of observations (Cronin, 
Stevenson, Sur, & Körding, 2010): Which hypotheses could plausibly explain different 
aspects of the data? Before making observations, a priori, what is the probability that these 
hypotheses will be supported? What is the likelihood for a hypothesis, given the data? What 
is the relative likelihood for a hypothesis, given all of the potential alternative hypotheses 
and their associated prior probabilities and likelihoods? What causal relations might 
influence the prior probabilities and likelihoods associated with these hypotheses? 
By asking these questions, investigators can more effectively select models and estimate 
associated parameter values and confidence intervals, given a particular set of 
observations, and given the set of alternative model candidates. More specifically, Bayesian 
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model selection starts by explicitly postulating dependencies between variables of interest, 
as well as uncertainty associated with these relations. In considering multiple hypotheses 
simultaneously in the joint posterior distribution—integrated using Bayes’ rule—not only 
do these methods take into account more relevant information during inference, but they 
also provide detailed descriptions of the range of alternative explanations. 
The relative plausibility of hypotheses can be assessed through a variety of methods, such 
as using the ratio of marginal probabilities associated with each model to calculate a “Bayes 
Factor.” The rules of probabilistic inference ensure that additional degrees of freedom are 
penalized during model selection, so instantiating “Occam’s Razor,” or the principle of 
parsimony. Bayesian methods most often produce similar results to more frequently used 
techniques, but informative prior probabilities and valid models allow inferences to be 
made from less data with greater certainty. Although inaccurate priors can interfere with 
valid inference, this problem can potentially be remedied with sufficient time and 
observations, as beliefs are updated on the basis of further evidence. 
Bayesian networks allow statistical inference to be performed with complex systems of 
conditional probabilities, which can be designed to reflect the structured relations of 
empirical phenomena. These models are “generative” in that they specify posterior 
marginal and joint probability distributions (i.e., probability density maps) resulting from 
the combination of all available relevant information. By using the structure of 
relationships among conditional probabilities, probabilistic graphical models increase 
inferential power by reducing the number of potential models that need to be considered. 
Before the advent of digital computers, Bayesian modeling was limited due to the 
infeasibility of performing the required computations. For generative models of any 
significant degree of complexity, the associated integrals are frequently intractable using 
analytic methods. Additionally, probability density maps can be impossible to visualize 
when they result in topological manifolds in multi-dimensional spaces. Fortunately, 
computer-aided sampling techniques can reliably approximate solutions by performing 
biased searches of estimated posterior probability distributions. 
With Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulations, Markov chains—characterized by a 
“memoryless” “random walk” in that the algorithm is not affected by previous states—
explore high-dimensional spaces by proposing randomly altered parameter values. These 
potential “steps” are evaluated using Bayes rule to calculate associated probabilities. If a 
proposal would result in a higher probability relative to the current state, the algorithm 
changes its current estimates and the chain moves to that region of parameter space. If the 
move would result in a lower probability relative to the current state, the algorithm either 
maintains its current position, or possibly takes a step based on probabilistic decision 
criteria. 
After sufficient iterations, time spent at different areas of the search space becomes 
proportional to the previously non-calculable, model-specified joint probability density for 
different permutations of parameter values. MCMC can estimate probability distributions 
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for complex models with arbitrary precision, given enough sampling time.2 Even more, it 
can be used to estimate specific parameter values, and the rank ordering of sampled states 
can be used to create credibility intervals for different tests, even with non-Gaussian 
posterior distributions. 
In addition to MCMC, analytic approaches based on variational (or approximate) inference 
are increasingly being used for their computational efficiency. Although these will not be 
discussed here, interested readers would do well to explore the rich literature that has 
accumulated on these methods and their applications. 
 
A whirlwind tour of Bayesian cognitive science; from functionalist characterization of 
complex probabilistic inference, to dynamic systems of evolving hypotheses 
“The probability of any event is the ratio between the value at which an expectation 
depending on the happening of the event ought to be computed, and the value of the thing 
expected upon its happening.” 
–Thomas Bayes (1701-1761) 
Simply, Bayesian cognitive science is an approach to understanding mental processes in 
terms of probabilistic inference. Less simply, this section will provide an overview of recent 
advances, for which there are five important points that it would be helpful for the reader 
to understand before proceeding to the next section: 
1. Bayesian cognitive science is a diverse field that focuses on using probabilistic 
inference to characterize problems solved by biological learners on Marr’s 
computational level of analysis. More recently, Bayesian cognitive scientists have 
also begun to use methods from statistical machine learning to describe 
psychological phenomena in algorithmic terms. 
2. “Infinite” (i.e., nonparametric) methods allow the structure of a variety of complex 
models to be discovered and modified on the basis of experience, as long as minimal 
initial knowledge is provided. 
3. The origins of this initial knowledge in biological learners are currently poorly 
understood, but the central role of embodiment will be described in the discussions 
that follow this section. 
4. The field is limited by a lack of integration between computational/algorithmic 
models and details of neural implementation. 
5. When combined with a cybernetics perspective, recent insights from computational 
neuroscience may provide a means of solving the challenge of integrating Bayesian 
models with biological mechanisms. 
For point #4, we recommend reading the article “Bayesian Fundamentalism or 
Enlightenment? On the explanatory status and theoretical contributions of Bayesian 
                                                        
2 However, with more complex models, in order to estimate representative solutions within polynomial time, 
it becomes important to design algorithms where proposal distributions efficiently converge upon 
anticipated sampling distributions. 
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models of cognition” (M. Jones & Love, 2011). For point #5, we recommend continuing to 
read this paper. 
From a “Bayesian” perspective, all aspects of thought can be understood as probabilistic 
inferences about “candidate world structures” (Tenenbaum, Kemp, Griffiths, & Goodman, 
2011). From this perspective, the mind is a collection of evolving probabilistic generative 
models that attempt to discover and characterize aspects of the world that cannot be 
directly observed (i.e., “latent” or “hidden” variables). More specifically, in developing these 
generative models through repeated observations, model-structure implies generalized 
knowledge, which specifies the broader class of situations to which future learning should 
generalize. 
Bayesian models are extremely flexible in their representational abilities. As previously 
described, graph structures (e.g. trees) provide constraints on model development, which 
increases efficiency by restricting the number of hypotheses that need to be considered. 
The logic of the graph can eliminate some classes of hypotheses a priori, thus setting their 
prior probabilities to 0. With smaller hypothesis spaces provided by the constraining 
structure of graphs, learners are able to generalize far more accurately, assuming that the 
graphical model is correct. To the extent that aspects of a graphical model are inaccurate, 
however, they reduce the learner’s ability to make valid inferences, but these models can 
be updated on the basis of further observations. With recent advances, computer programs 
can be used to produce complex models on the basis of graph grammars, or even 
statements in first order logic. 
By embedding these graphs in hierarchical networks, it is possible to discover the correct 
structural forms (i.e., grammars) as well as the particular structures (i.e., graphs) that 
describe conditional probabilistic associations between variables that represent the 
higher-order relations of diverse “real world” phenomena: 
“Hierarchical Bayesian models (HBMs) address the origins of hypothesis spaces and 
priors by positing not just a single level of hypotheses to explain the data but 
multiple levels: hypothesis spaces of hypothesis spaces, with priors on priors. Each 
level of a HBM generates a probability distribution on variables at the level below. 
Bayesian inference across all levels allows hypotheses and priors needed for a 
specific learning task to themselves be learned at larger or longer time scales, at the 
same time as they constrain lower-level learning” (Tenenbaum et al., 2011). 
Not only can these methods be used to facilitate particular inductive inferences, but they 
can also discover the most appropriate graph structures for representing the relations 
between objects and events. Additionally, structures are considered to be psychologically 
plausible both in terms of the face validity of graph representations, as well as the fact that 
their relative estimates of item similarity are comparable with the judgments of human 
subjects. 
With “infinite” or nonparametric hierarchical modeling, not even the number of variable 
classes needs to be known in advance. These methods balance inductive constraints and 
flexibility by positing an unbounded amount of structure, restricting the degrees of 
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freedom per dataset, and utilizing Bayesian model-selection to automatically apply Occam’s 
razor in network development. Nonparametric models can learn quickly from little data 
compared to what would be needed at lower levels of pattern abstraction. This feat is 
achieved by using degrees of freedom at higher levels to pool evidence from many 
hierarchically lower variables, a feature that Tenenbaum et al. (2011) refer to as the 
“blessing of abstraction.” 
Bayesian cognitive scientists believe that these methods of hierarchical model development 
are the most promising approach to understanding how humans learn and use abstract 
knowledge. However, these methods may both underestimate and overestimate the 
potential of probabilistic inference based on graphical models. Regarding overestimation, 
without the inductive constraints offered by embodiment—i.e., providing a toehold for the 
bootstrapping process that overcomes the challenge of impoverished stimuli—machine 
learning approaches will fail to develop sufficiently robust causal reasoning for broad 
applicability (Clark, 2008; Hirose, 2002; Pezzulo et al., 2011). Regarding underestimation, 
biologically-inspired algorithms—where cortical columns represent nodes in a particular 
kind of directed graphical model—may provide a common computational platform for 
understanding human cognition, as well as for developing flexible and general artificial 
intelligences (Friston, 2008; Hawkins, 2011; Hawkins & Blakeslee, 2004). 
 
Analogy as the core of cognition 
“All models are wrong, but some are useful.” 
–George E. P. Box (1919 - present) 
The promise of nonparametric Bayesian methods is strongly evidenced by their ability to 
develop complex models from limited observations, which support novel inferences on the 
basis of generalizable, structured knowledge representations. Regardless of whether or not 
conditional probabilities are emphasized, these capacities are generally recognized as 
fundamental aspects of intelligence, and the ability of analogical reasoning to support these 
processes has lead many cognitive scientists to suggest that analogy is the core of cognition 
(Flusberg, Thibodeau, Sternberg, & Glick, 2010; Gentner, 2010; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997; 
Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Larkey & Love, 2003; M. Mitchell & Hofstadter, 1990). In the 
following section, we will describe how models of analogical inference achieve 
computational level goals shared with Bayesian approaches. Then, we will discuss how 
common details of biological implementation may explain both probabilistic inference and 
analogical reasoning. 
What is analogy? 
Within the BAC framework, analogy is defined as any process that generates inferences (i.e., 
probabilistic implications) based on representations, which are broadly construed as 
structures whose features correspond to aspects of referenced phenomena. These referents 
can be aspects of the world (i.e., latent variables), implicit or explicit models of those 
aspects (i.e., estimated variables and parameters), or even models of models. In addition to 
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implication driven by representational-structure, we characterize analogies in terms of two 
inter-related qualitative dimensions of similarity and metaphoricity. We define similarity as 
the extent to which structures have shared features—compared with unshared features—
within a representational system. Thus similarity evaluations are relative to the similarities 
of all other potentially relevant analogies. Further, we define metaphoricity as the extent to 
which representations must be restructured in order to produce analogies of a given degree 
of similarity. Thus metaphoricity evaluations are functions of particular ranges of similarity 
values, the relevance of which are determined by contextual factors ranging from system 
processing limitations, to high-level pragmatic considerations. 
In addition to these qualitative dimensions of similarity and metaphoricity, a quantitative 
dimension of certainty can be estimated for particular inferences, as well as systems of 
inferences. From this perspective, all models are analogies with varying degrees of relative 
similarity and metaphoricity, as well as inferential certainty. This applies to both individual 
beliefs as well as scientific hypotheses: representations are never identical with the 
phenomena to which they refer; also, aspects of the world cannot be known directly, but 
must be inferred on the basis of limited observations. In this way, all cognition is inherently 
probabilistic, and so analogies, representations, and models are fundamentally similar 
concepts. Or, as Korzybski noted, “A map is not the territory… A map covers not all of the 
territory… A map is self-reflexive” (Blake & Ramsey, 1951). In other words, maps are 
analogies for the territories they represent, and models are analogies for the phenomena 
they describe. 
Thus, for any given domain, there are countless models with varying degrees of validity and 
reliability. In the language of analogy, the quality of a model corresponds to the degree of 
similarity between representations specified by hypotheses, compared with those 
generated by observations. Further, hypothesis testing uses the structure of a priori models 
to predict the structure of representations that are likely to result from experiments. The 
only difference between Bayesian and analogical approaches to inference is whether or not 
probabilities are explicitly calculated. Indeed, not only do Bayesian models consist of 
systems of analogies, but analogical reasoning can also be mathematically formalized in 
terms of Bayesian inference. Thus, there are multiple ways in which Bayesian cognitive 
science supports the claim that analogy is the core of cognition.3 
Models of analogy 
Numerous computational models of analogical reasoning have been developed (Gentner & 
Forbus, 2011; Kokinov & French, 2006; Lakoff, 2009; C. T. Morrison & Dietrich, 1995; 
Murdock, 2011), each with specific advantages and disadvantages. Symbolic approaches are 
particularly effective for problems involving high-level cognitive processing. Connectionist 
approaches, on the other hand, attempt to use excitatory and inhibitory associations 
                                                        
3 Analogical thinking is often considered to be a relatively unreliable mode of reasoning, but this belief both 
underestimates analogy and overestimates reason. While we may have absolute confidence in the rules of 
logic, complete certainty is lost as soon as we attempt to ground meanings with referents. Although this 
probabilistic epistemology eliminates the possibility of certain knowledge, in exchange, it provides a 
foundation for developing increasingly justified beliefs through experience. 
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between nodes in artificial neural networks for discovering patterns, and then 
manipulating those patterns such that cognitive-level goals can be realized by sub-symbolic 
mechanisms that are “biologically plausible.” Although these quasi-biological approaches 
have mild success when it comes to processing unstructured inputs, they tend to be limited 
in handling the high-level cognitive processes that are the strength of symbolic models. 
Alternatively, hybrid models of analogical reasoning combine symbolic and connectionist 
features in an attempt avoid their individual weaknesses while keeping their relative 
strengths. The BAC framework supports a hybrid model where the symbolic level emerges 
from a biologically realistic “connectionist” architecture that initially lacks symbolic 
representations. 
These approaches vary in important ways, but their similarities provide convergent 
validity for analogy being a fundamental property of minds. Next, we will describe a 
particularly influential symbolic model of analogical reasoning: Structure Mapping Theory 
(SMT) (Gentner, 1983). Although other models have attempted to incorporate biological 
constraints (Hummel & Holyoak, 1997; Larkey & Love, 2003; M. Mitchell & Hofstadter, 
1990; Petrov, 2000), SMT is particularly well-suited for describing a uniquely human form 
of analogical reasoning that emphasizes high-level relations among explicitly represented 
symbols (Premack, 1983). 
Structure Mapping Theory 
SMT was the first model of analogical reasoning to identify the importance of structural 
similarity between representations, as determined by common systems of relations across 
domains (Gentner, 1983). The theory suggests that humans make comparisons by 
establishing structural alignments between pairs of represented situations and projecting 
inferences between a source/base domain that is more detailed and a target domain that is 
less detailed. These representations consist of connected systems of different kinds of 
elements and their attributes, including specifications of objects, relations among these 
objects, and relations of relations. A maximally consistent alignment between 
representations identifies commonalities and differences, which are used to estimate the 
degree of similarity between mapped structures. 
On the basis of extensive research in humans, Gentner identified several essential 
phenomena for characterizing analogical processing (Gentner, 2006): 
1. Relational similarity: relational commonalities are more important than object 
commonalities in evaluating the similarity of representational structures. 
2. Structural consistency: representations are aligned by establishing one-to-one 
mappings of structure elements, while maintaining parallel connectivity of relations 
among mapped elements in each system. 
3. Systematicity: mappings are most significant when they align connected systems of 
relations, with more connected mappings having greater influences. 
4. Candidate inferences: if a base domain suggests a missing relation in the target 
domain, these relations can be inferred using “pattern completion.” 
5. Alignable differences: mapped differences are more salient if connected to shared 
systems of relations, and thus impact overall systematicity. 
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6. Interactive mapping: the mapping process is determined based on the particular 
domains being compared, thus different pairings can result in different 
interpretations. 
7. Multiple interpretations: a single comparison can lead to more than one 
interpretation for a given structural alignment. 
8. Cross-mapping: when object features suggest opposing interpretations to relational 
features, analogies are more difficult to process. 
Any adequate account of analogical reasoning must be able to explain these empirically 
verifiable phenomena, as well as other significant factors (e.g. emotional salience). 
Although a thorough analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, nearly every detail of SMT-
based algorithms and cognitive models can also be described in terms of statistical machine 
learning and computational neuroscience.4 In light of the fact that SMT was developed 
without considering details of biological implementation or probability theory, this 
compatibility provides convergent support for the BAC framework. 
The Structure Mapping Engine (SME) is a computational model that generates analogies 
according to the principles of SMT (Forbus et al., 1986). SME aligns representations by 
finding all local identity matches between the two systems in parallel, and then combining 
them into structurally consistent candidate clusters (i.e., kernels). These clusters of 
structures are then merged in a process that favors the largest kernels with the most 
systematicity, determined by the degree to which higher-order relations connect lower-
order matches. Aligned representations with greater systematicity maximize overall 
structural evaluation scores, which indicate preferred mappings. 
More specifically, SME begins by attempting to construct domain representations in a 
bottom-up fashion through a parallel search where all possible matches between domains 
are considered. These initial representations must satisfy the constraint of “tiered 
identicality” in that element pairings are only considered valid if the elements consist of 
identical relations. These representation sub-structures are then evaluated according to 
the parallel connectivity constraint, which requires that alignments between domains 
maintain consistent patterns of connectivity. The result of this process is a “hypothesis 
forest” that is grouped into maximally consistent clusters of match hypotheses, which are 
then sequentially combined to create final mappings. Hypotheses are combined using a 
“greedy merge” algorithm that selects the largest kernel and adds as many other kernels as 
possible. The systematicity bias favors mappings with higher-level relations that support 
“deep” explanatory or causal structure. Finally, if elements are present in the more 
complete base domain but absent in the less complete domain, then pattern completion 
fills in candidate inferences from the base to the target. 
In attempting to create alignments with maximum structural consistency, sometimes 
domains need to be restructured in order to discover relevant commonalities that may be 
missed based on initial representations. In the previously described process of forming 
                                                        
4 For example, the analogical systematicity bias can be explained in terms of Bayesian model selection, or it 
could also be explained in terms of coherent information processing being selected by a common cortical 
algorithm that minimizes prediction-errors. 
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representations, specific elements are counted as “matched” only if they satisfy the 
constraint that relationships between elements are identical. If a highly structurally 
consistent alignment could be obtained except for a single violation of this “tiered 
identicality” constraint, then under some circumstances an attempt is made to force a 
match. With the technique of “minimum ascension,” unmatched features are replaced with 
the categories from the next higher level of a taxonomic hierarchy of representational 
elements. 
Gentner and colleagues explain this process of loosening criteria as constituting a tradeoff 
where chance false positives are allowed for the sake of avoiding the false negatives of 
missed potential matches (Yan, 2003). Flexible analogical mapping enhances both the 
creativity and robustness of reasoning:5 
“Whatever internal representation is generated for seeing, for example, a cat is 
expressed in the same internal representational conventions from one instant to the 
next, although the details of the specific descriptions computed may change as the 
cat stretches.…  The specific contents of descriptions for two distinct cats, for 
example, might vary widely due to differences in what was attended to as well as 
differences between the cats themselves, but it seems likely that much of the basic 
vocabulary of perceptual and physical relationships is roughly constant over time. 
On the other hand, differences in attention and task demands will affect what is 
encoded and to some degree how, and learning can change conceptual vocabularies 
and encoding strategies.” 
However, SME prioritizes false positive avoidance over missed mapping opportunities, 
particularly for concrete descriptions. False matches require considering more 
correspondences in the process of merging local hypotheses to form analogical mappings, 
which could strain processing resources. Rather than allowing for overly flexible initial 
mappings, SME examines pre-existing mappings to see if results are acceptable by 
pragmatic considerations relevant to the current task. If initially produced mappings are 
found to be suboptimal, the process of “rerepresentation” involves performing minor 
alterations of the base and target domains to see if an improved alignment is achievable. 
Structure mapping and the mind 
MAC/FAC (Forbus, Gentner, & Law, 1994) is a SME-based model of similarity-guided 
retrieval that accounts for ways that human analogical reasoning deviates from theoretical 
optimality. In accordance with SMT, individuals emphasize structural commonalities for 
similarity judgments on items held in working memory. However these same participants 
focus on superficial commonalities when retrieving similar examples from long-term 
memory, even though structure tends to be favored in subjective evaluations. MAC/FAC 
attempts to explain this discrepancy by separating memory-based analogical mapping into 
a retrieval stage and a selection stage. In the MAC (Many are Called) stage, potential base 
systems are retrieved from a long-term memory as a function of the magnitude of dot 
products between the content vector descriptions of the systems in the long-term memory 
                                                        
5 When applied to category formation as in the model described below, this flexibility may aid in the 
formation of invariant representations. 
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knowledgebase and the contents of working memory (i.e., the probes). This method of 
retrieval produces candidate base domains with high surface similarity relative to probes. 
In the FAC (Few are Chosen) phase, SME creates and evaluates mappings between base and 
target systems and chooses solutions with the greatest overall similarity. If FAC chooses 
between potential base systems that are dominated by surface similarity in the MAC phase, 
then selected mappings will be similarly limited. Additionally, any factor that impairs the 
selection phase—whether by compromising working memory or restricting the amount of 
time available for evaluating mappings—will also compromise the quality of analogies and 
their associated inferences. 
SAGE (the program formerly known as SEQL) is a SME-based model of category learning that 
forms abstractions by making successive structural comparisons among exemplars 
(Kuehne, Forbus, Gentner, & Quinn, 2000). New exemplars are first compared to existing 
abstractions, and tested for whether the degree of similarity—determined by structural 
evaluation scores normalized by base-description size—is greater than a modeler-specified 
threshold for combination. If this similarity-based combination threshold is exceeded, the 
abstraction is modified to represent the intersection formed via alignment, and becomes 
increasingly generalizable as non-overlapping aspects are removed. If the degree of 
similarity is insufficient for surpassing the threshold for representation combination, these 
new exemplars are then compared against existing exemplars to create a new abstraction. 
If the new exemplar is too dissimilar from any item in memory, it is temporarily stored as a 
separate exemplar, which may or may not eventually get assimilated into an abstraction. 
Additionally, projection of candidate inferences from abstractions to exemplars increases 
the detail of exemplar representations. In this way, SAGE begins with no generalizations, 
but bootstraps its way towards abstraction via comparing exemplars and performing 
category-based induction. 
Thus, structure mapping not only describes analogical reasoning, but it also provides a 
general model for cognitive development through analogical inference. Convergent support 
for this model is provided by its strong resemblance to the “memory-prediction 
framework” from computational neuroscience (Hawkins & Blakeslee, 2004), as well as the 
“hierarchical Dirichlet process” from machine learning (Griffiths, Canini, Sanborn, & 
Navarro, 2009). Both Bayesian and analogical inference allow learners to discover category 
structures from limited observations, and enable increasingly sophisticated 
representations to develop with experience. However, an unconstrained search of solution 
space would require examining a prohibitively large number of permutations before 
“toeholds” could be discovered for these bootstrapping processes. As we will discuss in the 
next sections, a cybernetics perspective clearly implicates embodiment as a necessary 
source of useful inductive biases for self-organizing cognitive systems. 
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Principles of cybernetics 
“SOCRATES: Or again, in a ship, if a man having the power to do what he likes, has no 
intelligence or skill in navigation [αρετης κυβερνητικης, aretes kybernetikes], do you see 
what will happen to him and to his fellow-sailors?” 
–Plato, Alcibiades I 
Cybernetics is the interdisciplinary science of abstract principles in the organization and 
functioning of complex systems, emphasizing how information, models, and control actions 
can be used to steer towards and maintain goals, while counteracting disturbances 
(Heylighen & Joslyn, 2003). This analysis approach is concerned with system properties 
that are independent of specific components or material constituents. In this way, 
superficially dissimilar systems can be described with similar concepts, thus enabling 
comparison, synthesis, and inference generation based on a variety of source phenomena. 
Thus, cybernetics focuses on relations such as differences, connections between elements 
or processes, and transformations such that generalizable knowledge can be abstracted 
from physical aspects of systems. 
In cybernetic analysis, the observer begins by conceptually separating the object of study 
(i.e., the system) from other phenomena (i.e., the environment), and proceeds to 
distinguish between the presence and absence of various properties of the system, which 
can consist of physical attributes or distinctive features of processes. The conjunction of all 
values of properties at a particular moment constitutes a system’s state. A system is 
constrained to the degree that the actual variety of states that the system can exhibit is 
smaller than the variety of possible states. Constraints reduce uncertainty about the state 
of systems, and thus allow for non-trivial predictions about aspects of systems based on 
formally modeled relations, dependencies, or couplings. By adding more constraining 
information about the state of a system via observations and candidate model structures, 
the probabilities of alternative states become smaller, and thus model-variety and 
uncertainty can be reduced. 
In cybernetic terms, nervous systems evolved as control systems for guiding the behavior 
of living organisms, which are considered as autonomous agents that pursue goals while 
resisting obstructions that would cause deviations from goal attainment. Since organisms 
are dynamical systems, these goals are equilibria in state space to which a system returns 
after perturbations. These goals can also be subsets of acceptable states (i.e., attractors), 
with the defining dimensions being essential variables that must be kept within a limited 
range compatible with the survival of the system. The essential variables that allow an 
organism to preserve itself define its homeostatic boundaries, which both constrain and 
are maintained by dynamic equilibria that constitute the processes of life. The equilibria 
are dynamic because multiple constraints need to be satisfied for an organism to survive—
and many of these factors depend on conditions over which the organism only has limited 
control—hence it will need to shift between and balance various goals, depending on 
circumstance. 
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Varela (1979), described organisms as self-producing (i.e., autopoietic) systems (Rudrauf, 
Lutz, Cosmelli, Lachaux, & Le Van Quyen, 2003): 
“An autopoietic system is organized (defined as a unity) as a network of processes of 
production (transformation and destruction) of components that produces the 
components that: 1) through their interactions and transformations continuously 
regenerate and realize the network of processes (relations) that produce them; and 
2) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in the space in which they exist by 
specifying the topological domain of its realization as such a network.” 
Although functional relations are asymmetric in a variety of ways, the organism as a whole 
consists of mutually embedded subsystems that couple with each other—i.e., reciprocal 
action defined by simultaneous acting on and acting upon—so that the organism can more 
effectively couple with its environment in ways that allow sustained homeostasis, such that 
the process of autopoesis can continue. Thus, nervous systems are inherently embodied, and 
interactions with the organizationally enclosing bodies as well as external environments 
are essential for understanding their functioning. 
The selective pressures producing nervous systems and other biological adaptations can be 
broadly classified into two categories: 1) maintaining homeostatic boundaries, and 2) 
ensuring reproduction. Organisms need to survive long enough to reproduce, but genetic 
perpetuation is the core of natural selection (Dawkins, 2006). Different genetic 
combinations result in different emergent—i.e., the generation of qualitatively different 
wholes from interacting parts—behaviors, and the process of natural selection will favor 
whatever maximizes overall replication of the underlying genes. These goals can be viewed 
as gradients, or "fitness" functions over state spaces, which define the degree of "value" or 
"preference" for different states. Thus, evolutionary processes influence nervous systems to 
facilitate action-patterns that maximize “utility functions” for genetic fitness (Dawkins, 
1996).  
Adapted nervous systems act as control systems that resist perturbations to essential 
variables, whether or not these perturbations originate from inside or outside of organisms 
(Heylighen & Joslyn, 2003). In this way, the motivations of individual organisms 
correspond to the “goals” of genetic evolution. There are three primary mechanisms by 
which these goals can be achieved through adaptive regulation: 1) Buffering passively 
absorbs or dampens perturbations; 2) Feedforward control suppresses disturbance before 
they can affect the system's essential variables; and 3) Feedback control compensates for 
errors or deviations from goals after they have occurred. When considered independently, 
none of these methods are sufficient for successful control of a complex system in a 
complex environment: 
1. Buffering is achieved both by the overall robustness of the system, as well as the 
default reactivity of the organism to perturbations (e.g. homeostatic set points), but 
on its own it is incapable of handling major perturbations or returning the organism 
to equilibrium. 
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2. Feedforward control is achieved by actions based on the prediction of future 
perturbations (i.e., allostasis), but on its own it will be incapable of handling all of 
the permutations of disturbances that the organism may encounter. 
3. Feedback control is achieved by responding to deviations from desired states, but it 
must first allow errors to occur before corrective action can be taken. 
Complex nervous systems, however, incorporate all three methods on multiple levels in 
permitting organisms to more effectively navigate their environments, respond to 
challenges, and prevent entropy from internally increasing. By remembering the history of 
feedback control in patterns of neural connections, and then using those memories to 
change buffering set points and guide feedforward control, nervous systems become 
sufficiently effective at regulation that they are able to justify their substantial metabolic 
costs (Attwell & Laughlin, 2001; Howarth, Gleeson, & Attwell, 2012). According to Ross 
Ashby’s “law of requisite variability,” the greater the variety of disturbances that a system is 
likely to face, the greater the variety of actions needed by the regulator to respond to those 
challenges. This principle is the major factor underlying the accumulation of nervous 
system complexity over evolutionary time. Indeed, nervous systems are ideally suited for 
meeting this need, since they are able to use experience to reconfigure their connections 
and produce a wide range of actions. 
Even extremely simple nervous systems can be thought of as predictive control systems. 
The flexible connectivity of neurons allows organisms to achieve all three forms of 
regulatory control to some extent. For example, associative learning has been 
demonstrated in the nematode, Caenorhabditis elegans, even though it only has 932 
genetically-determined cells, of which 302 are neurons (Catharine H, 2004). However, 
association only allows an organism to achieve a limited degree of feedback (via classical 
conditioning) and feedforward (via stimulus generalization) control. 
Nonetheless, even with a limited repertoire of actions, association is an implicit 
instantiation of Bayesian-analogical inference (Courville, Daw, & Touretzky, 2006).6 More 
specifically, a stimulus-response pairing may have been adaptive in the past, but applying a 
similar response to an associated stimulus will have varying likelihoods of being adaptive 
outside of the original learning context. The estimated utility of a response depends on 
combining conditional probabilities for the degree of association between stimuli, as well 
as the likelihood that the responses will be appropriate. In addition to utilizing 
probabilistic inference, associative learning can be thought of as a basic type of analogy, in 
that representations corresponding to past stimulus-response feature conjunctions are 
compared with representations generated by present and anticipated experiences. By 
applying similar responses to similar stimuli, organisms use implicit analogical inference to 
increase the probability of adaptive behavior. 
In addition to basic association, neural systems have evolved to implement control 
hierarchies (Fuster, 2009; Krawczyk, Michelle McClelland, & Donovan, 2011), where higher-
level goals control the settings for subsidiary goals (Heylighen & Joslyn, 2003). By adding an 
                                                        
6 Even individual synapses implement conditional probabilities by influencing the degree of inter-neuron 
functional connectivity. 
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additional layer of control, a goal can become the results of an action taken to achieve a 
higher-level goal, and more layers can be introduced for further nesting of goals and 
actions. Additional layers can reduce the variety of perturbations, but will not be able to 
eliminate errors. The number of levels required to reduce error to “acceptable” levels—
which would be determined by the ability of events to impact essential variables—depends 
on the efficacy of each level in predicting disturbances and generating appropriate 
response. 
However, these new levels come at the expense of additional regulatory machinery, and 
may introduce noise or delays for some actions. In both engineering and evolution, 
parsimony of construction is superior, all else being equal. But when all else is not equal, 
the introduction of an additional control level represents a “metastable transition,” which is 
thought to be the basic unit of the evolution of cybernetic systems. In the next section, we 
will discuss a particularly significant metastable transition represented by the evolution of 
mammalian cortex. 
 
Cortical control systems 
"If the inputs to a system cause the same pattern of activity to occur repeatedly, the set of 
active elements constituting that pattern will become increasingly strongly interassociated. 
That is, each element will tend to turn on every other element and (with negative weights) to 
turn off the elements that do not form part of the pattern. To put it another way, the pattern 
as a whole will become 'auto-associated'. We may call a learned (auto-associated) pattern an 
engram." 
–Gordon Allport (1987-1967) 
Cortex allows organisms to remember specific sequences of events from the past, and on 
the basis of these memories, predict specific sequences that might occur in the future. In 
Fuster’s (2006) model of cortex, memory and knowledge are represented in distributed 
and overlapping networks of interacting neurons that are “heterarchically” organized into 
functional cycles within perception-action hierarchies (Fuster, 2006, 2009; Fuster & 
Bressler, 2012). He refers to these auto-associated representational units as “cognits,” and 
considers them to be the elemental basis of cortical memory. Over the course of 
development, increasingly sophisticated representations evolve as more complex patterns 
are abstracted from simpler patterns, which allow new kinds of patterns to be discovered. 
From this perspective, nested dynamics of causal relations in the world are mirrored by 
nested dynamics of neuronal representations, which exist in varying degrees of abstraction 
and complexity with respect to perception-action sequences. 
Intuitively, hierarchical organization suggests that this gradient of increasing abstraction is 
reflected by locations of representations relative to primary sensory and motor cortices. 
That is, concrete perception-action sequences will be located closer to where sensations 
first input, and where specific motor commands first output. More abstract patterns (e.g. 
high-level goals) will be located closer to multi-modal association cortices and further from 
primary cortices. However, these abstract patterns will be connected to representations on 
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multiple levels of the hierarchy on the basis of auto-associative links formed through past 
and ongoing experience. 
Converging support for this theory is beginning to accumulate from the fields of 
computational neuroscience and machine learning. More specifically, it has been proposed 
that cortex may implement a common algorithm for hierarchical pattern abstraction, which 
affords complex associations that would be difficult to discover by statistical learning 
within non-hierarchically organized networks (Friston, 2008; Friston & Kiebel, 2009; 
George & Hawkins, 2009; Hawkins & Blakeslee, 2004; Kiebel, Daunizeau, & Friston, 2008; 
Schofield et al., 2009). In addition to its theoretical parsimony, this hypothesis is supported 
by studies of cortical micro-circuitry. After discovering the existence of cortical columns in 
1978, Mountcastle suggested that these structures possibly enabled a common 
computational process to take place throughout cortex (Mountcastle, 1978). More recently, 
machine learning systems are being developed in which hierarchically organized cortical 
columns constitute nodes within probabilistic networks for advanced pattern recognition 
(Hawkins, 2011).  
Cortex is anatomically distinguished by groups of approximately 80-100 neurons with 
common developmental origin, arranged into columns that are positioned perpendicularly 
to the cortical sheet with its six semi-distinct layers (Krieger, Kuner, & Sakmann, 2007; 
Mountcastle, 1997). Except for a few differences in visual and motor cortices, these 
“minicolumns” show remarkable anatomical homogeneity across brain areas, as well as 
across different mammalian species. Notably, cytoarchitectonic studies suggest that 
morphological variation may be initially lacking, and diversity is created by experience 
(Buxhoeveden & Casanova, 2002; E. G. Jones & Rakic, 2010). Minicolumns further self-
organize into groups of approximately 60-100 units to form macrocolumns (Markram, 
2006). These macrocolumns, or “cortical modules” consist of multiple minicolumns bound 
together via short-range connections with similar, although still heterogeneous, response 
properties.7 Although the total number of cortical modules for an average human brain is 
difficult to determine precisely, estimates range from one to two million macrocolumns 
(Johansson & Lansner, 2007). 
Importantly, the functional significance of a particular cortical column or neuron emerges 
as a function of the particular experiences of an individual organism. In light of the central 
role of self-organization in shaping cortex, it is unlikely that natural selection was able to 
influence organisms through genetically specified cortical representations, or responses to 
those representations. A priori, the non-linearity of development suggests that genetic 
selection would be unable to produce such adaptations, even with strong selective 
pressures. If a mechanism relies on pre-specifying details of biology that are unpredictable 
in principle (Elbert et al., 1994; Korn & Faure, 2003; Rabinovich & Abarbanel, 1998; 
Wolfram, 2002), then it is also un-evolvable. Thus, rather than “hard-wiring” particular 
adaptive behaviors, cortex evolved as a general-purpose learning system that attempts to 
predict future observations on the basis of past experiences. 
                                                        
7 Column-based cortical modules have no relation or resemblance to the special-purpose computational 
modules discussed within evolutionary psychology. 
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From this perspective, Bayesian-analogical inference is an emergent property of a common 
cortical algorithm that shapes sequences of representations so that organisms can more 
effectively couple with their environments. In terms of Bayesian probability, goal oriented 
behavior would result from a particular kind of semi-parallel, semi-stochastic, self-
sampling generative model, where nodes corresponding to specific action dynamics are 
selected based on model-estimated utility. In terms of analogical structure mapping, this 
biased search of perception-action sequence representations would attempt to maximize 
alignment between estimated—current states as well as the consequences of potential 
actions—and desired experiences by chaining together multiple representations in varying 
configurations, at multiple levels of abstraction. Since different sequence representations 
correspond to different imagined and physically generated behaviors, goal attainment 
could be achieved by maximizing the overall degree of alignment between the 
representations activated by imaging desired states and representations activated by 
imagining continuing and potential actions. 
More specifically, if cortex automatically performs structure mapping among the most 
highly activated networks, then analogical alignment of representations could adaptively 
select from a hierarchy of action sequences at different levels of abstraction. That is, by 
imagining different scenarios relative to goal attainment, alignable differences would 
correspond to subordinate actions, for which alignable differences would represent further 
subordinate actions within a hierarchy of action sequences. As each potential action is 
considered, the auto-associative property of nervous systems would automatically activate 
candidate action representations based on similarities with past experiences. Considering 
that superordinate and subordinate action sequences are themselves auto-associatively 
linked, they would provide mutual constraints as parallel structure mapping continuously 
minimizes overall alignable differences between representations on multiple levels. By this 
account, similar cognitive processes could be involved in selecting high-level strategies for 
goal attainment, as well as in low-level adjustment of specific sequences retrieved from 
memory in a moment-to-moment fashion for precise motor control. 
Theoretically, cortex could efficiently generate utility maximizing analogical inferences by 
minimizing through a general principle of “free energy” minimization (Friston, 2010; 
Hawkins, 2011; Kozma, Puljic, Balister, Bollobas, & Freeman, 2004). Multiple compelling 
mechanisms have been proposed within this paradigm, and here we will propose a novel 
mechanism by which the brain could tune itself to minimize its overall prediction-error and 
implement credit-assignment during learning: 
1. If a minicolumn’s inputs are predicted in advance via stimulation of specific 
inhibitory interneurons within the column, then only those neurons without their 
respective inhibitory interneurons activated will increase their firing rates. 
2. However, if a sufficient number of non-predicted inputs occur, and a percolation 
threshold is surpassed, the entire column will become active, resulting in a cascade 
of activity-predictions in functionally connected columns. 
3. Depending on the degree of functional connectivity with inhibitory interneurons of 
neuromodulatory nuclei—where changes in the activity of a single neuromodulator 
releasing neuron can influence millions of cortical neurons through their diffuse 
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projections—any dynamic that causes overall activity to be reduced should result in 
decreased inhibition of the production of these neuromodulators. 
4. This net disinhibition would enhance the most robustly active patterns, strengthen 
the connections underlying these patterns (i.e., reinforcement), and thus increase 
the efficiency of the dynamics contributing to successful prediction (i.e., minimized 
error signals). 
Although this activity-minimizing algorithm could potentially result in stasis, regulatory 
nuclei of the hypothalamus and brainstem will stimulate these inhibitory interneurons to 
the degree that action is needed to restore homeostatic balances. Thus an organism could 
not remain permanently inactive, as physiological signals of hunger would result in 
stimulation of these regulatory nuclei, whose activity can be thought of as signifying the 
distance from homeostatic set points, or as signifiers of biologically specified predictions 
for which deviations result in error signals. Over time, cortical dynamics resulting in the 
minimization of error signals from these regulatory nuclei will become distributed across 
the cortical heterarchy as habitual predictions. The impact of these habitual predictions on 
overall functioning would constitute the evolving utility function of the organism.  
In this way, although natural selection is limited in its ability to influence specific 
behaviors, utility could be maximized—within bounds—by the tendency for dynamical 
systems to minimize free energy. In terms of analogy, this would correspond to minimizing 
the complexity of the underlying sequence representations. However, the body provides an 
initial set of values that constrains which of the countless aspects of the generative model 
are optimized. Indeed, BAC suggests that organisms are such effective learners because 
they begin with a sense of their own embodiment as a kind of prototypical object from 
which they can partially generalize, and they pay attention to this object because it is 
directly connected to the mechanisms of reinforcement (Leknes & Tracey, 2008). This 
account of cognitive development can potentially explain the knowledge that infants 
possess (Carey & Gelman, 1991), as well as how they use it to partially generalize to other 
classes of phenomena (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999), even if sometimes incorrectly. 
Thus, Bayesian-analogical inference not only allows organisms to interpret ambiguous 
information from impoverished sensory data, but it also enables modulation of behavior 
based on prior knowledge. To the degree that previous experiences allow organisms to 
imagine outcomes as well as anticipated reward value, they are able to make choices that 
exhibit bounded rationality relative to current preferences and beliefs, which can then be 
updated through further experience. In this way, cortical memory automatically shapes 
behavior on the basis of evolving expected utility estimates. Additionally, as reasoning 
becomes increasingly sophisticated, high-level cognition can contribute to the types of 
expectations that learners will form, which in turn determine what they will do, experience, 
and come to expect in the future. As the developing person becomes capable of perceiving 
reward-value from increasingly abstract reinforcers, these high-level meanings would be 
crucial for understanding the future course of cognitive-affective evolution. 
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BAC and consciousness 
“The aim of scientific explanation throughout the ages has been unification, i.e., the 
comprehending of a maximum of facts and regularities in terms of a minimum of theoretical 
concepts and assumptions.” 
 –Herbert Feigl (1902-1988) 
As a partial test of the BAC framework, we will now attempt to parsimoniously describe 
aspects of a poorly understood phenomenon: how neural systems give rise to conscious 
experiences. Although embodiment is essential for enabling self-awareness and higher-
level properties of consciousness (A. D. Craig, 2003; A. D. B. Craig, 2009; Damasio, 2000, 
2003), in this particular discussion we will focus on the role of Bayesian-analogical 
inference in supporting the capacity for conscious awareness. 
According to the “integrated information” theory of consciousness, qualitative properties of 
experience (i.e., qualia) are generated by relationships of activity within neuronal 
complexes (Balduzzi & Tononi, 2009; G Tononi & Edelman, 1998). These “quale states” 
correspond to a dynamically changing core of functional activity, which can be analyzed as 
topological manifolds within abstract feature-spaces. This promising theory may help to 
explain many properties of the brain, such as hierarchical organization, small-world 
network connectivity, and localization of function. Indeed, information-theoretical 
measures of effective computational capacity may be able to characterize network 
properties that are necessary for supporting various kinds of cognitive processing in 
different systems. 
In systems where complexes produce a sufficient degree of integrated information, 
numerous and varied processes can be synergistically unified in a "dynamic core" of 
neuronal ensembles (Gerald M Edelman, Gally, & Baars, 2011; Seth & Baars, 2005). The 
dynamic core is a complex defined by coalitions of patterns that "compete" and “cooperate” 
within the brain (G. M. Edelman, 1987, 1993). Patterns contributing to core dynamics can 
undergo re-entrant feedback amplification from the mutually constraining relations of the 
patterns constituting the grand coalition, which are stabilized via their functional 
interconnectivity. This emergent ‘virtual machine’ creates a system of relations, which 
temporarily increases the amount of integrated information available to patterns that can 
successfully couple with the dynamic core. In this way, complexes with a critical mass of 
integrated functional connectivity enable a “global workspace” that allows information to 
be more effectively shared among distributed neural systems (Baars, 2005). Thus BAC 
proposes that consciousness is the capacity of the mind to support global workspaces 
defined by a dynamic core of competing patterns, which depends on, but is not identical to 
a system's integrated information. 
By equating consciousness with integrated information, Tononi et al. (2008) may be 
conflating necessary with sufficient conditions. Further, the emphasis on mechanistic 
realization may overlook “real patterns” on the cognitive level (D. Dennett, 1991, 1996), for 
which the relevant details are more effectively described in terms of Bayesian-analogical 
inference. For a system to be ‘conscious’, integrated information must apply to 
representations with experience-grounded meanings. These representations may not 
  
 
21 
necessarily be explicitly defined symbols, but their semiotic content could be implied in a 
cybernetic manner, based on the ways in which particular features of the system influence 
how it interacts with other systems. A complex could have an arbitrarily high amount of 
integrated information, but it will not be conscious unless it also refers to patterns external 
to the system. More accurately, a system's capacity for consciousness is proportional to the 
integrated information that can impact representational dynamics. 
With respect to dynamic core theory, Edelman (2004) may have been mistaken in 
stipulating that conscious states are not causal, but constitute epiphenomenal consequences 
of core transformations (G. Edelman, 2004). First, ‘causality’ is not just a simple logical 
primitive, or some ‘objective’ feature of nature. Rather, it is an abstraction, or an analogy 
with a moderate degree of metaphoricity relative to observations whose representations 
achieve a sufficient degree of similarity that we categorize them as “causal.” From a BAC 
perspective, causality is a high-level schema for processes that tend to change in regular 
and predictable ways according to factors such as temporal ordering and spatial continuity. 
Further, complex phenomena are best understood in terms of emergent causality, wherein 
system-wide properties are both influenced by the synergistic interactions of its 
constituents, but these interactions are also influenced by system wide properties. Or, in 
other words, neither parts nor wholes are ontologically primary in any absolute sense; 
rather, their functional interdependence means that wholes and parts are inseparable. 
Indeed, it may be possible to formalize this sort of reciprocal causation using the same self-
recursive functions that characterize all dynamical non-linear (i.e., chaotic) systems, 
including minds. Thus, consciousness exhibits emergent causality in that is capable of 
constraining and being constrained by cognitive processes impacted by the dynamic core. 
In light of these considerations, not only are probabilistic analogies fundamental to all 
cognition, but the inferential power of explicit analogical reasoning may have been an 
important selective pressure for the adaptations underlying human-like consciousness 
(Gentner, 2010). This hypothesis is supported by analyses of long distance brain 
connectivity where prefrontal cortex was found to be a topologically central “hub” with a 
disproportionately large number of vertices in a network model (Modha & Singh, 2010). 
Although these data were based on tracing studies in rhesus monkeys, this prefrontal hub 
has been maximally increased in humans relative to non-human primates (Preuss, 2011). 
Further, prefrontal activation is strongly implicated in analogical reasoning, which is 
uniquely developed in humans, and which almost certainly depends on coordinating 
dynamics in multiple brain areas (Bunge, Wendelken, Badre, & Wagner, 2005; Cho et al., 
2010; Green, Fugelsang, Kraemer, Shamosh, & Dunbar, 2006; Krawczyk, McClelland, 
Donovan, Tillman, & Maguire, 2010; Luo et al., 2003; R. G. Morrison et al., 2004; Preusse, 
van der Meer Elke, Deshpande, Krueger, & Wartenburger, 2011; Volle, Gilbert, Benoit, & 
Burgess, 2010). 
Additionally, through reentrant stabilization of representations participating in the 
dynamic core, consciousness may be a necessary adaptation for the kind of analogical 
reasoning that seems to have been uniquely developed in humans (Gentner, 2010; 
Premack, 1983). By privileging relational information and high-level conceptual structures 
(e.g. causal models), learners are capable of inferring analogies that would be 
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undiscoverable on the basis of mere perceptual similarity. Furthermore, structured 
representations can also increase the integrated information of the core by minimizing 
failed-predictions, thereby helping to stabilize complex dynamics within the grand 
canonical ensemble of the mind. Thus consciousness and analogy are both mutually 
supporting and mutually constraining in their synergistic inter-relationships.  
Finally, this reciprocal causation implies that abstract cognition can alter core dynamics on 
the basis of moment-by-moment transformations of explicit meanings and simulated 
experiences. Since semantic properties can specify functional connections between 
disparate representations within the cortical heterarchy, these cognitive processes—and 
the neural adaptations supporting large-scale information integration—vastly increase the 
number of permutations for possible functional interconnections. In this way, conscious 
cognition may flexibly constrain cortical generative models as they estimate the latent 
variables of reality. 
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